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COMMENTS
FAILING TO PROTECT PARTICIPANTS’ FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS IN DRUG TREATMENT COURT
Michel Panaretos Fullerton*
I. INTRODUCTION
Drug treatment courts originated as alternatives to the traditional, ad-
versarial criminal justice system for non-violent drug and alcohol offenders.
These courts were born of altruistic intentions to both help drug and alcohol
offenders achieve abstinence and reduce recidivism.1  Unfortunately, some
drug treatment courts bypass defendants’ fundamental rights upon entry
into, and exit from, the programs.  For example, in Mineral County, Mon-
tana, non-violent drug offenders enter into complicated contracts with the
Mineral County DUI/Drug Treatment Court, sometimes without having re-
ceived counsel, thus violating their Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel.
Furthermore, the treatment program itself inherently renders participants
vulnerable to inadvertently waiving their Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, which may lead to additional charges.
* Michel Panaretos Fullerton, candidate for J.D. 2013, The University of Montana School of
Law.  The author specially thanks Stephanie Holstein and Jeff Kuchel for their unfailing support over
the past three years.  The author offers additional thanks to the staff and editors of the Montana Law
Review for their input throughout the development of this comment.  And, to Karlyle Plouffe, the author
sends her best hopes and wishes for his future.
1. There are 11 adult drug treatment courts in Montana: City of Billings (established 2005), Cas-
cade County (established 2005), Custer County (established 2004), Flathead County (established 2009),
Fergus County (established 2005), Gallatin County (established 1999), Glacier County (established
2009), City of Kalispell (established 2010), Mineral County (established 2006), Richland County (estab-
lished 2007), and Yellowstone County (established 2011).  Because each court presents its own complex
structure, this paper will focus only on the Mineral County DUI/Drug Treatment Court as a case study.
Although there are a number of issues that could be addressed, this comment focuses on Fifth and Sixth
Amendment Rights.
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This comment begins with the story of Karlyle Plouffe, a young adult
participant in the Mineral County DUI/Drug Treatment Court.  Next, the
paper details the Sixth Amendment fundamental rights afforded to all crimi-
nal offenders and the manner in which those rights apply to defendants
upon entry into drug treatment court.  The paper then details the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and presents the sole ex-
ception to the rule—namely, that one must affirmatively waive that privi-
lege.  The paper outlines the history of drug treatment courts, as well as the
Bureau of Justice Assistance’s best practices for drug treatment courts.
Next, those best practices are compared to and contrasted with the Mineral
County DUI/Drug Treatment Court practices.  Finally, the paper proffers
solutions to bring the Mineral County DUI/Drug Treatment Court into
alignment with the Bureau of Justice Assistance’s best practices.
II. KARLYLE PLOUFFE’S STORY
On March 30, 2011, nineteen-year-old Karlyle Plouffe (“Plouffe”) was
arrested after a deputy sheriff discovered marijuana in the pocket of
Plouffe’s pants. While awaiting arraignment, Plouffe learned about the
Mineral County DUI/Drug Treatment Court (“Treatment Court”).  In ex-
change for pleading guilty to the possession charge in Superior Town
Court, he could enroll in Treatment Court.  If he successfully completed the
Treatment Court program, the guilty plea would be expunged from his re-
cord.
A. Drug Treatment Court
As codified in the Drug Offender Accountability and Treatment Act,2
Plouffe entered a conditional guilty plea to the possession charge and a
related trespass charge3 and consequently gained entry to Treatment Court.4
As all Treatment Court participants must do, Plouffe signed an Agreement
for Enrollment in Mineral County DUI/Drug Treatment Court (“Treatment
Agreement”), a seven-page contract that binds the participant to numerous
provisions and rules.  For example, the participant must:
2. Mont. Code Ann. § 46–1–1104(1) (2011).
3. It is of note that during Plouffe’s initial appearance in Superior Town Court on March 31, 2011,
he pled not guilty to criminal trespass and requested a court-appointed attorney.  However, the Agree-
ment for Enrollment in Mineral County DUI/Drug Treatment Court and Order Approving & Adopting
Said Agreement, which Plouffe signed on or around April 21, 2011, erroneously indicated that Plouffe
had pled guilty to the trespass charge.
4. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, State v. Plouffe at ex. 3 (Mont. 4th Jud. Dist., Mineral Co. Jan. 19,
2012) (No. DC-2011-21).
2
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complete all tasks assigned by the DUI/Drug Court Team and . . . honestly
answer all questions asked by team members, counselors, therapists or law
enforcement personnel including the probation officer.5
The Treatment Agreement also mandated that the participant “consult with
and remain in regular contact with . . . the Defense Attorney.”6
By April 21, 2011, Plouffe had yet to meet with a defense attorney.
The Superior Town Attorney signed the Treatment Agreement and dated it
April 21, 2011.  Both Plouffe and a private defense attorney also signed the
Treatment Agreement, separately, although it is unclear when either of
them did so.7  During the spring of 2011, however, the Treatment Court did
not have a contract with any defense attorney.8  Thus, many defendants,
including Plouffe, appeared, entered pleas, and signed their Treatment
Agreements without having spoken with defense counsel.9
Despite the fact that he had not yet signed the Treatment Agreement,
Plouffe made his initial appearance in Treatment Court on April 13, 2011.
At that time, the court ordered a weekly status report (“Status Order”), as it
does each week for every Treatment Court participant.10  Throughout the
ensuing six months, the Treatment Court sanctioned Plouffe on several oc-
casions, including 15 days of incarceration, community service, and home
arrest.11
B. Second Arrest & Felony Charges
At approximately 2:15 p.m. on October 5, 2011, as Plouffe had done
every Wednesday since April 2011, he provided a urine sample to the
Treatment Court probation officer.12  Then, as had become his routine,
Plouffe remained in the building and attended a support group meeting for
all drug treatment court participants.  Meanwhile, Plouffe’s field urinalysis
showed positive for benzodiazepines.13
Immediately after viewing the field urinalysis and unbeknownst to
Plouffe, the Treatment Court probation officer sought and located a recent
police report regarding a report of stolen prescription pills about which he
5. Def.’s Mot. to Suppress, State v. Plouffe at ex. 3 (Mont. 4th Jud. Dist., Mineral Co. Jan 19,
2012) (No. DC-2011-21).
6. Def.’s Mot. to Suppress, supra n. 5, at ex. 3.
7. Id.
8. Telephone Interview with Julie Bettis, Mineral County DUI/Drug Treatment Court Clerk (Nov.
17, 2011).
9. Id.
10. Def.’s Mot. to Suppress, supra n. 5, at ex. 4.
11. Id. at exs. 5–29, 33, 36.
12. Id. ex. 37.
13. Id.
3
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had overheard.14  A local woman had reported missing oxycodone pills to
the Mineral County Sheriff’s Office two days earlier.  The woman had told
dispatch she believed a man who was a friend of Plouffe’s had stolen
them.15  After speaking with the woman, a deputy sheriff had concluded he
lacked probable cause to arrest anyone and noted the investigation was
complete:
By the time our conversation was over, I had ascertained that since there is
such a high volume of traffic through the household, that there were at least
eight people who could have stolen the medication.  No further action will be
taken at this time by myself at this time to investigate this case any further.16
The deputy sheriff later said that, upon completion of his investigation on
October 3, 2011, he wanted the Treatment Court probation officer to exer-
cise the probation officer’s authority over Plouffe to acquire a urine sample
to connect Plouffe to the missing oxycodone—with the limited physical
evidence to which the deputy sheriff lawfully had access, he lacked confi-
dence that a viable case could be made without a positive urinalysis.17
As Plouffe sat in the support group meeting on October 5, 2011, the
Treatment Court probation officer and a felony probation officer entered the
meeting room and instructed Plouffe to leave the meeting and follow them.
Once alone, the Treatment Court probation officer informed Plouffe he had
tested positive for something, but he did not tell Plouffe for which sub-
stance(s).18  Plouffe told the Treatment Court probation officer that he and
two friends had consumed Valium together.19  After the Treatment Court
probation officer conferred with both the felony probation officer and the
Mineral County Sheriff, the probation officers decided to interview Plouffe
again.20
The felony probation officer Mirandized Plouffe21 but neglected to
contact Plouffe’s attorney of record.  Additionally, neither she, the Treat-
ment Court probation officer, nor the Mineral County Sheriff informed
14. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, supra n. 4, at exs. 30, 31, 35.
15. Id. at ex. 34.
16. Id. at ex. 35.
17. Id. at ex. 36. It is worth noting the woman reported missing only oxycodone pills on October 3,
2011.  When oxycodone is present in urine, one derivative of oxycodone, oxymorphone, is revealed.
However, on October 5, 2011, Plouffe’s field urinalysis revealed the presence of benzodiazepines only.
When probation officers, and later a deputy sheriff, interrogated Plouffe, they repeatedly asked him
where he obtained the Valium (which is within the class of benzodiazepines).  It wasn’t until October
15, 2011, when a comprehensive MedTox Laboratories report was returned and showed the presence of
oxymorphone in Plouffe’s urine, that law enforcement had physical evidence to prove Plouffe’s con-
sumption of oxycodone.  Thus, it is questionable whether law enforcement had probable cause for a
custodial interrogation of Plouffe about the woman’s missing oxycodone in the first instance.
18. Id. at ex. 30.
19. Id. at ex. 31.
20. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, supra n. 4, at ex. 32.
21. Id. at ex. 31.
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Plouffe that some of their questions would exceed the scope of a routine
discussion after a positive urinalysis and, instead, would pertain to a new
investigation regarding missing prescription pills.22  When asked why he
believed he was being questioned, Plouffe answered, “Um, I failed [the
urinalysis].”23  Throughout the probation officers’ interrogation of Plouffe,
Plouffe believed he was merely being questioned as part of Treatment
Court.24
As a result of the interview, the Treatment Court probation officer ar-
rested Plouffe under Title 45 for Criminal Contempt.25  Treatment Court
Judge Wanda James consequently sanctioned Plouffe with seven days’ in-
carceration for testing positive for benzodiazepines,26 and Plouffe was
booked into jail.27
Later that evening, a deputy sheriff Mirandized Plouffe and asked
Plouffe why he thought he was there.28  Again, Plouffe answered, “I’m get-
ting blamed . . . .  Um, I failed the U.A. the day I brought in.”29  The deputy
sheriff did not contact Plouffe’s attorney of record either.  Then, the deputy
sheriff and the Treatment Court probation officer interrogated Plouffe and
reminded Plouffe of his obligation to answer all questions honestly in ac-
cordance with his Treatment Agreement.30  When the deputy sheriff con-
cluded his questioning, Plouffe asked, “Am I staying here?”31  His question
indicates Plouffe failed to appreciate the severity of his situation.  Finally,
no officer ever contacted Plouffe’s attorney of record.  Ten days later, a
comprehensive MedTox Laboratories report revealed the presence of ox-
azepam, a benzodiazepine, and oxymorphone, an opiate derivative of ox-
ycodone.32
Based on Plouffe’s incriminating statements and the positive urinal-
ysis, the State filed an Information on November 7, 2011, charging Plouffe
with Criminal Distribution of Dangerous Drugs and two counts of Criminal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs, all felonies.33  The maximum sentence that
22. Id. at ex. 39; see also id. at exs. 32, 38.
23. Id. at ex. 48.
24. Id. at ex. 40.
25. Mont. Code Ann. § 45–7–309; Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, supra n. 4, at ex. 41.  Drug treatment
court participants are sanctioned for contempt of court under § 46–1–1104(4)(g).  It remains questiona-
ble whether Plouffe’s failed urinalysis rose to the level of criminal contempt under § 45–7–309(1).
26. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, supra n. 4, at ex. 42.
27. Id. at ex. 41.




32. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, supra n. 4, at ex. 33.
33. Id. at ex. 44.
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can be imposed on a defendant for those charges is life in prison.34  Nearly
a year later, Plouffe pled guilty to one felony count of Criminal Distribution
of Dangerous Drugs because he had sold one oxymorphone pill to a friend
for five dollars.35  The court sentenced Plouffe to three years in the boot
camp program at Treasure State Correctional Facility.36  He remains there
as of the date of publication.
III. DRUG TREATMENT COURTS
Drug treatment courts originated from the desire and need to cease
criminal activity relating to drug and alcohol abuse.37  Some courts identi-
fied the unmet need of drug abusers gaining access to rehabilitative ser-
vices.38  Those who conceived of drug courts hoped to reduce drug use and
the criminal behavior that often results from it through a hybrid, specialized
system to meet the unique needs of addicts who commit crimes.39  In addi-
tion, by channeling all non-violent drug offenders into one court, judges,
prosecutors, and public defenders would have more time and resources for
non-drug cases.40  The judiciary contemplated aiding addicted offenders in-
stead of exclusively focusing on punishing them.41  Judges would sentence
drug-addicted offenders to treatment instead of sentencing them to jail.42
Today, some characterize drug treatment courts as “revolutionary because
they offer a dynamic alternative to the failed punitive policies of traditional
courts’ responses to drug use.”43
A. History and Purpose of Drug Treatment Courts
The drug court in Miami-Dade County, Florida, which began in 1989,
is recognized as the first of its kind, combining the authority of the criminal
justice system with the benefits of substance abuse treatment systems.44
The Miami drug court took jurisdiction over first-time felony drug offend-
ers and implemented three phases of treatment, which, together, last ap-
34. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 45–9–101(2), 102(4).
35. Judgment, State v. Plouffe (Mont. 4th Jud. Dist., Mineral Co. Sept. 4, 2012) (No. DC-2011-21).
36. Id.
37. Natl. Assoc. Drug Ct. Profs., Drug Ct. Stands. Comm., Defining Drug Courts: The Key Compo-
nents 1 (U.S. Dept. Just., Bureau Just. Assistance Oct. 2004).
38. Greg Berman & Aubrey Fox, Trial & Error in Criminal Justice Reform: Learning from Failure
28 (The Urb. Inst. Press 2010).
39. Defining Drug Courts, supra n. 37, at 1.
40. Id. at 4.
41. Berman & Fox, supra n. 38, at 29.
42. Id.
43. Problem-Solving Courts: Justice for the Twenty-First Century? 37 (Paul Higgins & Mitchell B.
Mackinem eds., ABC-CLIO, LLC 2009).
44. Natl. Drug Ct. Inst. Rev., vol. 1, issue 1, 13–14 (Summer 1998).
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proximately one year.45  The first phase allowed defendants to detoxify, the
second phase included an outpatient drug treatment program, and the third
phase provided job training and educational assistance.46
Despite the lack of either centralized planning or a presidential direc-
tive,47 by 1993, nine other drug treatment courts had sprung up throughout
the United States.48  However, the increased popularity of drug treatment
courts gave rise to certain problems.  For example, in Minneapolis and Den-
ver, the caseload in drug treatment courts was staggering, and dozens of
bench warrants were issued daily for defendants who failed to appear.49
Some drug treatment courts failed to distinguish between drug dealers and
drug users, consequently gaining the reputation that anyone could gain en-
try into drug treatment court.50  Nevertheless, over 2,100 drug treatment
courts existed in the United States by 2008.51
As a response to the growing prevalence of drug treatment courts, the
Bureau of Justice Assistance, a branch of the U.S. Department of Justice,
took notice of this alternative court system and developed a set of best prac-
tices it defines as Key Components for drug treatment courts.52  The Bureau
of Justice Assistance encourages a non-adversarial approach when con-
structing drug treatment courts.53  The prosecution and defense are en-
couraged to work together to balance public safety and participants’ due
process rights.54
Similarly, Montana legislative history reflects the legislature’s concern
regarding protection of drug treatment court participants’ due process
rights.55  Treatment courts were implemented by Montana State District
Courts in 2005 “to reduce recidivism and restore drug offenders to being
productive, law-abiding, and taxpaying citizens.”56  Montana drug treat-
ment courts are deferred-judgment programs in which defendants enter con-
ditional guilty pleas,57 providing a pretrial diversion for drug offenders.58
Montana drug treatment courts offer a program of incentives and sanctions
45. Berman & Fox, supra n. 38, at 30.
46. Id.
47. Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Good Courts: The Case for Problem-Solving Justice 38 (The
New Press 2005).
48. Berman & Fox, supra n. 38, at 31.
49. See id. at 32–34.
50. Id. at 37.
51. Berman & Fox, supra n. 38, at 42.
52. Defining Drug Courts, supra n. 37, at iii.
53. Id. at 3.
54. Id.
55. Mont. Sen. Comm. on Jud., Hearing on HB 721, Montana Drug Offender Accountability and
Treatment Act, 2005 Reg. Sess. (Mar. 22, 2005).
56. Mont. Code Ann. § 46–1–1102.
57. Problem-Solving Courts, supra n. 43, at 37.
58. Mont. Code Ann. § 46–1–1104(1).
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to assist participants in both finding recovery from drug addiction and ceas-
ing criminal behavior associated with drug use and addiction.59  If a partici-
pant successfully completes both the treatment program and the aftercare
period, the participant can withdraw his guilty plea, and the charge will be
dismissed with prejudice.60
Since 2009, the Montana DUI Task Forces Program within the Mon-
tana Department of Transportation has funded, either wholly or in part,
some of the adult treatment courts in Montana, including the Mineral
County DUI Court.61  In 2011, the Montana State DUI Task Force provided
a grant, which currently funds the Mineral County DUI/Drug Treatment
Court.62  DUI task forces operate to “reduce and prevent impaired driv-
ing.”63  The State Highway Traffic Safety Office’s annual report for fiscal
year 2012 lists Mineral County as receiving supplemental funding for: in-
creasing responsible alcohol sales and service training, increasing alcohol
compliance checks, increasing law enforcement presence at high risk times/
events, and education and prevention activities with youth.64
The DUI Task Force provides funding with the following understand-
ing:
DUI courts are a proven strategy to reduce impaired driving among ha-
bitual drunk drivers who are not typically affected by education or public
safety efforts, nor by traditional legal sanction.
Entry into DUI court is voluntary, and the offender signs a contract with
the DUI court.  This allows the court to seek effective long-term change in
behavior by treating underlying substance abuse issues rather than focusing
only on punishing the offender.
Chemical dependency treatment is emphasized and is accompanied by
intensive monitoring/testing.  This typically includes a transdermal alcohol
monitoring bracelet for 60–90 days, frequent urinalysis testing, EtG blood
testing, and requiring the DUI court client to blow into a preliminary breath
tester (PBT) at every possible opportunity, such as court appearances, home
visits, and visits with the compliance officer.
Continued alcohol and drug usage is discouraged through a progressive
system of sanctions.  Positive changes are recognized and rewarded via incen-
tives.  This model involves increased accountability (usually weekly DUI
court sessions before the DUI court team and the Judge) and access to a vari-
59. Mont. Code Ann. § 46–1–1103(5).
60. Mont. Code Ann. § 46–1–1104(5); Def.’s Mot. to Suppress, supra n. 5, at ex. 3.
61. St. Hwy. Traffic Safety Off., Montana Highway Traffic Safety Annual Report 43 (Mont. Dept.
Transp. 2012), available at http://www.mdt.mt.gov/publications/docs/brochures/safety/hsp_report.pdf
(accessed Mar. 16, 2013).
62. Telephone Interview with Julie Bettis, Mineral County DUI/Drug Treatment Court Clerk (Nov.
17, 2011).
63. Mont. Dept. Transp., DUI Task Forces, http://www.mdt.mt.gov/safety/dui_taskforces.shtml
(accessed Mar. 16, 2013).
64. Annual Report, supra n. 61, at 42.
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ety of other services to help the individual achieve sobriety, learn pro-social
behaviors, and become a productive member of society.
With the repeat offender as its primary target population, DUI courts
follow the Ten Key Components of Drug Courts and the Ten Guiding Princi-
ples of DWI Courts, as established by the National Association of Drug Court
Professionals and the National Drug Court Institute.65
Based on the foregoing, it remains unclear if the courts that receive DUI
Task Force funding claim jurisdiction over DUI repeat offenders, first-time
drug offenders, or both.  In Mineral County, the Treatment Court partici-
pants are first-time or second-time misdemeanor drug offenders.
B. Best Practices of Drug Treatment Courts
The National Association of Drug Court Professionals, in conjunction
with the Bureau of Justice Assistance, has identified Ten “Key Compo-
nents”66 for drug treatment courts.
1. Drug treatment courts should help those arrested for drug- or alcohol-
related offenses become both abstinent and law-abiding citizens.67
2. Those eligible for drug treatment court should be identified as quickly as
possible after arrest.68
3. A drug treatment court program should incorporate both primary and
mental healthcare to identify concomitant disease states and other chal-
lenges participants may face.69
4. Urinalyses should be administered to drug treatment court participants as
one marker of continued struggles or achieved success.70
5. Drug treatment court participants achieve the goal of abstinence, in part,
by receiving both immediate sanctions and rewards for his/her relapses
and accomplishments.71
6. A continuous judicial presence reminds drug treatment court participants
of the link between their treatment and the criminal justice system.72
7. Drug treatment court participant team personnel should continuously
monitor and evaluate participants.73
8. Drug treatment court team personnel should receive continuing education
and training, specifically interdisciplinary education of the legal system
and effective treatment for alcohol and drug abuse.74
65. Id. at 43.
66. Defining Drug Courts, supra n. 37, at iii.
67. Id. at 2.
68. Id. at 5.
69. Id. at 7.
70. Id. at 11.
71. Id. at 13–14.
72. Defining Drug Courts, supra n. 37, at 15.
73. Id. at 17.
74. Id. at 21–22.
9
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9. Drug treatment court team personnel should initiate cooperation among
the drug treatment court, law enforcement, and community-based pro-
grams related to drug and alcohol abuse.75
10. The drug treatment court prosecutor and defense counsel, together,
should employ a non-adversarial approach to balance public safety and
drug treatment court participants’ due process rights.76
With respect to the final key component, the drug treatment court pros-
ecutor and defense counsel effect a participant’s abstinence and law-abiding
behavior by working as a team and assuming separate responsibilities.77
For example, the prosecuting attorney should initially review the case and
determine if the defendant meets eligibility requirements for drug treatment
court78 while the defense attorney reviews the citation and charging docu-
ment.79  “Problem-solving courts, at least the ones that are any good, have
taken special pains to involve defense attorneys at the earliest possible stage
of their development.  As a result, problem-solving courts have been sensi-
tive to issues of due process . . . .”80
In addition, the prosecuting attorney and defense attorney play pivotal
roles in protecting the drug treatment court participant’s fundamental rights.
The prosecuting attorney “[a]grees that a positive drug test or open court
admission of drug possession or use will not result in the filing of additional
drug charges based on that admission.”81  The defense counsel must advise
the drug treatment court participant of the rules, consequences for breaking
the rules, rights that the participant will temporarily or permanently waive,
and the implications of choosing to either participate or not participate in
drug treatment court.82  In addition, the defense counsel should apprise the
defendant of alternative legal and treatment paths.83  Finally, the defense
attorney should encourage the participant to admit to alcohol or drug use in
open court and with any drug treatment court team personnel since the pros-
ecutor will not pursue additional criminal charges as the result of such ad-
missions.84
75. Id. at 23.
76. Id. at 3–4.
77. Id. at 3.
78. Defining Drug Courts, supra n. 37, at 4.
79. Id.
80. Berman & Feinblatt, supra n. 47, at 55.
81. Defining Drug Courts, supra n. 37, at 3.
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IV. FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS AFFORDED
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
The Bill of Rights enumerates individual rights, some of which the
U.S. Supreme Court has categorized as fundamental.85  To ensure due pro-
cess, the Court has held that fundamental rights require all states to adopt
them as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment.86  In addition, if, dur-
ing the process of convicting a criminal defendant, law enforcement, the
prosecutor, or the judiciary violates a defendant’s fundamental right, the
conviction may be rendered constitutionally infirm.87  The Montana Su-
preme Court has expanded the rights that the U.S. Supreme Court considers
fundamental, providing additional protection to the criminally accused.88  If
one conviction is constitutionally infirm, subsequent charges borne of that
conviction may, too, be tainted.89
In Montana, when an adult is charged with a non-violent drug offense
in a jurisdiction that maintains a drug treatment court, he is allowed to enter
a guilty plea without the benefit of counsel.  Generally, nothing is facially
inappropriate about a misdemeanor offender entering a guilty plea without
counsel.  Nonetheless, when a defendant does so in order to gain acceptance
into a drug treatment court, the potential consequences include forced dis-
closure of felony charges and significant prison time.  Moreover, entering a
guilty plea as a condition to enter drug treatment court involves an atypical
plea bargain.90  A defendant who is contemplating pleading guilty in order
to enter drug treatment court should understand the drug treatment court
program rules, which include the waiver of certain fundamental rights.91
A. Defendants’ Sixth Amendment Rights When Entering Drug
Treatment Court
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution bestows upon the crim-
inally accused the right to a defense attorney.92  In Gideon v. Wainwright,93
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the right to counsel constitutes a funda-
mental right.94  After Florida charged Gideon with a felony, he requested a
85. See e.g. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340–341 (1963).
86. Id. at 342.
87. Burgett v. Tex., 389 U.S. 109, 114–115 (1967).
88. State v. Maine, 255 P.3d 64, 72 (Mont. 2011).
89. See State v. Okland, 941 P.2d 431, 434 (Mont. 1997).
90. Trent Oram & Kara Gleckler, An Analysis of the Constitutional Issues Implicated in Drug
Courts, 42 Idaho L. Rev. 471, 493 (2006).
91. Id. at 494.
92. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
93. Gideon, 372 U.S. 335.
94. Id. at 344–345.
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court-appointed attorney.95  The district court judge informed Gideon that
only those accused of capital offenses were entitled to court-appointed
counsel.96  Gideon proceeded pro se and was subsequently convicted.97  He
petitioned for habeas corpus, and, after the Florida Supreme Court denied
relief, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.98  The U.S. Supreme
Court overturned its own ruling in Betts v. Brady,99 where it held that the
criminally accused, if unrepresented, are unfairly prejudiced because the
legal system requires a certain amount of expertise.100
Later, the U.S. Supreme Court extended the Gideon decision by hold-
ing that those criminally accused of misdemeanors have the right to assis-
tance of counsel: “The assistance of counsel is often a requisite to the very
existence of a fair trial.”101  Furthermore, the Court noted that complex le-
gal and constitutional questions arise even when the crime is punishable
only by a maximum jail sentence of six months or less.102  In Scott v. Illi-
nois,103 however, the Court limited the right to counsel to the criminally
accused who face incarceration.104
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the fundamental right to counsel
must be extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.105
Thus, pursuant to Montana statutes, a judge must inform the defendant of
his right to counsel at the defendant’s initial appearance after arrest.106  A
defendant may subsequently waive this right but only if the court deter-
mines the defendant did so knowingly, voluntarily, intelligently, and un-
equivocally.107  When challenging a conviction obtained in violation of the
right to counsel, the defendant need only proffer an unequivocal, sworn
statement that he did not waive this fundamental right.108
95. Id. at 336–337.
96. Id. at 337.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
100. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345.
101. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 30–31 (1972).
102. Id. at 33.
103. Scott v. Ill., 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
104. Id. at 382.
105. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342.
106. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 46–7–102, 46–8–101.
107. Mont. Code Ann. § 46–8–102; see e.g. State v. Weaver, 917 P.2d 437, 441 (Mont. 1996); State
v. Langford, 882 P.2d 490, 492 (Mont. 1994); Okland, 941 P.2d at 433.
108. State v. Walker, 188 P.3d 1069, 1073 (Mont. 2008).
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1. Rights at Trial & Entry of Plea—Federal
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the accused is afforded the right
to counsel at all critical stages of the criminal process.109  The entry of a
guilty plea, whether to a misdemeanor or felony, qualifies as a “critical
stage,” to which the right to counsel adheres.110  In Iowa v. Tovar,111 the
U.S. Supreme Court addressed the requisite specificity of a plea colloquy
before a trial court can accept the guilty plea of an accused appearing with-
out counsel and still meet Sixth Amendment requirements.112  The Court
held that the constitutional requirement is met when “the trial court informs
the accused of the nature of the charges against him, of his right to be
counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of allowable punishments
attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea.”113  In its decision, the Court ob-
served, and the State agreed, “that a defendant must be alerted to his right
of the assistance of counsel in entering a plea.”114
2. Rights at Trial & Entry of Plea—Montana
In State v. Allen,115 the Montana Supreme Court held that Allen’s in-
ability to remember waiving his right to counsel was insufficient evidence
to rebut the presumption of regularity of a prior conviction.116  The minor
defendant alleged that he did not actually waive his right to counsel.117
Allen pled guilty to Driving under the Influence of Alcohol in the Helena
City Court, which is not a court of record.118  The Montana Supreme Court
looked at which boxes the judge had checked on a “court form” and the
judge’s handwritten notations on a “court record” when deciding this
case.119
In State v. Howard,120 the defendant challenged the constitutionality of
a plea she entered pro se in Missoula Municipal Court in 1997 because it
could potentially enhance her punishment on a subsequent felony DUI
charge.121  Howard argued that, when she appeared before the 1997 munici-
pal court and pled guilty, she could not afford counsel, was not represented
109. Me. v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985); U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).
110. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 34; see also Ala. v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
111. Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004).
112. Id. at 81.
113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 91.
115. State v. Allen, 206 P.3d 951 (Mont. 2009).
116. Id. at 954.
117. Id. at 953–954.
118. Id. at 954.
119. Id. at 954–955.
120. State v. Howard, 59 P.3d 1075 (Mont. 2002).
121. Id. at 1076.
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by counsel, and was not advised of her right to a court-appointed attorney
prior to entry of her guilty plea.122  Howard also maintained that she never
waived her right to court-appointed counsel.123
In support of its case, the State presented testimony that Howard was
told that if she pled guilty she was thereby waiving all of her rights.124  The
State reasoned that, because Howard pled guilty, it could be inferred that
Howard validly waived her right to counsel.125  The Montana Supreme
Court disagreed:
Although employing the formula, “If you plead guilty, you also waive your
right to counsel” may streamline the process of obtaining a defendant’s
waiver and guilty plea, such a shortcut is not permissible where a person is
waiving her fundamental right to counsel.  The difference between, “By
pleading guilty you waive your right to counsel,” and “Do you waive your
right to counsel?” is important; only the latter provides the defendant with the
opportunity to affirmatively and expressly waive the right.  Combining the
two issues in one affirmative statement increases the possibility that an unrep-
resented defendant may become confused and decreases the likelihood that
[he] will be able to specifically, voluntarily, and knowingly waive [his] right
to counsel.126
Ultimately, the Montana Supreme Court held that the district court
erred, as a matter of law, in finding Howard waived her right to counsel.127
To meet Sixth Amendment requirements, a waiver must be secured before
the entry of the guilty plea.128  Because Howard’s waiver was not secured
prior to entry of her plea, it was constitutionally infirm.129
3. Rights at Trial & Entry of Plea—Montana Drug Treatment Courts
Regarding drug treatment courts, Montana statutes stop short of ex-
pressly mandating a defendant’s right to counsel.  A “public defender or
defense attorney” is listed as someone who may serve on the drug treatment
court team.130  Subsequent Montana Code Annotated sections, which estab-
lish the drug treatment court structure, also reference defense counsel.
“Participation in drug treatment court is . . . subject to the consent of the
prosecutor, the defense attorney, and the court pursuant to a written agree-
ment.”131  This section seems to imply that a defense attorney is required.
122. Id. at 1076–1077.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1077.
125. Id. at 1078.
126. Howard, 59 P.3d at 1078.
127. Id. at 1079.
128. Id. (emphasis added).
129. Id.
130. Mont. Code Ann. § 46–1–1103(7)(c) (emphasis added).
131. Mont. Code Ann. § 46–1–1104(2).
14
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It could be argued that because drug treatment courts do not contem-
plate jail time, the defendant does not have a right to counsel.132  Neverthe-
less, any defendant who fails to complete a drug treatment court program
and aftercare period can ultimately face incarceration because the defendant
has already entered a conditional plea of guilty.  Thus, any charge consid-
ered in drug treatment court necessarily includes the contemplation of jail
time.  In addition, Montana statutes: 1) confer authority upon the drug treat-
ment judge to “reduce [the] period of incarceration,”133 and 2) give them
jurisdiction over drug offenders “[a]s a condition of . . .  incarceration.”134
At a minimum, these sections certainly imply that drug treatment courts do,
in fact, have potential incarceration within their contemplation.
B. Drug Treatment Court Participants’ Fifth Amendment Rights
A criminal defendant has assurance he will not be compelled to testify
against himself.135  The U.S. Supreme Court has broadly construed this pro-
tection, limiting when self-incriminating evidence can be used against a
criminal defendant.136  “The object of the [Fifth] Amendment ‘[w]as to in-
sure that a person should not be compelled, when acting as a witness in any
investigation, to give testimony which might tend to show that he himself
had committed a crime.’”137
The Fifth Amendment was made applicable to the States by the Four-
teenth Amendment.138  Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the U.S. Su-
preme Court explicitly prohibited states from conditioning this constitution-
ally-protected right by the “exaction of a price.”139  This protection also
applies to interrogation by police officers out of court if criminal charges
follow.140
Both the Fifth Amendment and the Montana Constitution protect a
person from compelled self-incrimination in a criminal proceeding.141  Al-
though a person must generally invoke the privilege affirmatively, excep-
tions to this general rule exist.142  For example, does a person waive his
132. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 373; Okland, 941 P.2d at 433.
133. Mont. Code Ann. § 46–1–1104(5).
134. Mont. Code Ann. § 46–1–1104(1).
135. U.S. Const. amend. V.
136. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 461 (1975) (citing Hoffman v. U.S., 341 U.S. 479, 486
(1951)).
137. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973) (quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547,
562 (1892)).
138. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
139. Garrity v. N.J., 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967).
140. Maness, 419 U.S. at 464.
141. U.S. Const. amend. V; Mont. Const. art. II, § 25.
142. Minn. v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 429 (1984).
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privilege against self-incrimination if he fails to affirmatively invoke that
privilege, yet was under duress at the time?  In Union Pacific Railroad Co.
v. Public Service Commission of Missouri,143 the U.S. Supreme Court ac-
knowledged the inherent absurdity that exists when the government cites
conduct while under duress to prove supposed volitional acts.144  After de-
fendant charged the plaintiff railroad with an excessive fee to pass through
a small portion of the State of Missouri, plaintiff sued and claimed it paid
the fee under duress.145  The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the rail-
road volitionally opted to conduct interstate commerce through Missouri
and thus consented to pay whatever fees defendant charged.146  The U.S.
Supreme Court overturned the lower court’s holding by rationalizing that, if
upheld, a government entity could always impose an unconstitutional bur-
den by threatening penalties worse than the penalties for opting out of a
supposed volitional act.147  In other words, the privilege against self-incrim-
ination can be “self-executing.”148
Together, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the use of a
person’s coerced statements in a subsequent state criminal trial because
such statements retain automatic protection.149  Coerced statements are
those that force a person to make an impossible decision—“a choice be-
tween the rock and the whirlpool.”150  The individual need not formally
invoke the privilege if the government prevents a “voluntary invocation of
the Fifth Amendment by threatening to penalize the individual should he or
she invoke it.”151  If the government induces a person to waive his Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent by threatening him with sanctions “capa-
ble of forcing the self-incrimination,” the consequent incriminating state-
ments are considered coerced.152
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit determined that, al-
though sex offender inmates “technically volunteered” for a sex offender
treatment program, the participants’ Fifth Amendment rights were violated
because the program imposed sanctions for silence or invocation of the
right to remain silent.153  “Requiring an offender to choose between answer-
143. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Commn. of Mo., 248 U.S. 67 (1918).
144. Id. at 70.
145. Id. at 68–69.
146. Id. at 69.
147. Id. at 69–70.
148. State v. Fuller, 915 P.2d 809, 813 (Mont. 1996).
149. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003); Or. v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985).
150. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 496.
151. Fuller, 915 P.2d at 813.
152. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806 (1977).
153. Amanda C. Graeber, McKune v. Lile and the Constriction of Constitutional Protections for
Sexual Offenders, 23 Rev. Litig. 137, 156–158 (2004).
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ing an incriminating question or going back to jail, may constitute coercive
government conduct prohibited by the Fifth Amendment.”154
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has held, even if one’s fears re-
garding repercussions from remaining silent are unfounded, his subsequent
incriminating statements are deemed coerced.155  In Garrity v. New
Jersey,156 police officers were interrogated regarding alleged irregularities
in the handling of cases in municipal courts.157  Although the officers were
advised of their respective rights to remain silent, they feared being dis-
charged if they invoked those rights.158  Therefore, the officers answered
the questions and incriminated themselves; these self-incriminating state-
ments were subsequently used to prosecute them.159  Despite their failure to
affirmatively invoke their right to remain silent, the U.S. Supreme Court
held the police officers’ self-incriminating statements could not be used in
subsequent criminal proceedings because their statements were coerced.160
The Montana Supreme Court has interpreted the Montana Constitution
as providing protection from compelled self-incrimination.161  In State v.
Fuller,162 the Montana Supreme Court held that if the threat of punishment
hangs in the air, then self-incriminating statements cannot be used in a later
criminal proceeding.163  Fuller was convicted of three counts of attempted
sexual assault.164  The district court suspended Fuller’s sentence on the con-
dition that he participate in a sexual offender treatment program.165  Fuller’s
treatment program required honest disclosure of his offense history.166  In
fact, participants were expelled from the program for dishonesty or failure
to disclose.167  Fuller complied and disclosed his prior offenses.  Fuller’s
self-incriminating statements were provided to the Billings Police Depart-
ment, which subsequently investigated.168  The State then charged Fuller
with three new sexual offenses.169
154. Jamie Tanabe, Right against Self-Incrimination v. Public Safety: Does Hawai’i’s Sex Offender
Treatment Program Violate the Fifth Amendment?, 23 U. Haw. L. Rev. 825, 826–827 (2001).
155. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 496.
156. Garrity, 385 U.S. 493.
157. Id. at 494.
158. Id. at 494–495.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 500.
161. Fuller, 915 P.2d at 812 (citing Mont. Const. art. II, § 25).
162. Fuller, 915 P.2d 809.
163. Id. at 816.




168. Fuller, 915 P.2d at 811.
169. Id.
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Fuller moved to dismiss the charges, alleging the State had violated his
constitutional protection against compelled self-incrimination.170  Fuller
conceded that the State had not expressly threatened to punish him if he
invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege but argued punishment was implied
due to the mandatory condition of the treatment program that he honestly
disclose his offense history.171
The Montana Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s denial of
Fuller’s motion to dismiss by specifically citing language from the treat-
ment program rules.  “Patients will be terminated from the program if . . .
they are in denial or do not honestly disclose their offending history.”172
The Montana Supreme Court rejected the State’s argument that Fuller could
have invoked his privilege against self-incrimination, explaining that the
lower court necessarily threatened Fuller with revoking his probation by
including the mandatory provision to honestly disclose his offense his-
tory.173  In Fuller’s case, revocation of probation equated to imprison-
ment:174
There is thus a substantial basis in our cases for concluding that if the State,
either expressly or by implication, asserts that invocation of the privilege
would lead to revocation of probation, it would have created the classic pen-
alty situation, the failure to assert the privilege would be excused, and the
probationer’s answers would be deemed compelled and inadmissible in a
criminal prosecution.175
The Fuller Court adopted a test from the U.S. Supreme Court to estab-
lish when a self-executing privilege exists.  The line is drawn where a de-
fendant’s “probation conditions merely require him to appear and give testi-
mony about matters relevant to his probationary status or whether they went
further and required him to choose between making incriminating state-
ments and jeopardizing his conditional liberty by remaining silent.”176
170. Id.
171. Id. at 814.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 815.
174. Fuller, 915 P.2d at 814.
175. Id. at 813 (citing Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435).
176. Fuller, 915 P.2d at 816 (quoting Murphy, 465 U.S. at 436).  The Montana Supreme Court
distinguished Fuller in State v. Hill when it allowed the State to offer evidence gathered from Hill’s
participation in a sexual offender treatment program when imposing a sentence.  207 P.3d 307, 314
(Mont. 2009).  However, the Court reconciled its decision with Fuller by noting the material factual
differences—Hill did not face substantial penalties if he failed to disclose, and Hill was not prosecuted
for the prior offenses he disclosed. Id.
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V. COMPARING BEST PRACTICES TO THE MINERAL COUNTY DUI/DRUG
TREATMENT COURT’S PRACTICES
The Mineral County DUI/Drug Treatment Court falls short of achiev-
ing the Bureau of Justice Assistance’s key components.  Specifically, the
prosecutor and the lack of a defense attorney fail to protect drug treatment
court participants’ due process rights.
A. Prosecutor’s Failure to Protect Participants’ Fundamental Rights
In the traditional adversarial context, the judge ultimately determines
sanctions imposed upon a criminal defendant.  Drug treatment courts call
for something different, though.  Despite the recommendation that the pros-
ecutor should participate in a coordinated response to a drug treatment court
participant’s positive urinalysis, the Mineral County Treatment Court judge,
alone, determines the sanction(s) imposed.  More importantly, the Mineral
County Attorney does not follow the recommendation that prosecutors
agree not to file additional drug charges if a drug treatment court participant
tests positive for drugs or alcohol or confesses in open court to drug or
alcohol use.
If the prosecutor assured drug treatment court participants that they
would not face additional drug-related charges if they confess or test posi-
tive, participants would certainly feel more secure in discussing their strug-
gles.  When asked about the strengths of the Washington, D.C. drug treat-
ment court, participants “emphasized that the importance of knowing the
rules and seeing them applied consistently and fairly was critical in their
compliance with drug testing requirements.”177  If the Treatment Court
adopted a policy to refrain from filing additional charges, the drug treat-
ment court, prosecutor, defense attorney, and participant would each oper-
ate from the same set of consistent rules.
In Mineral County, the prosecutor does not follow this significant rec-
ommendation, effecting seemingly arbitrary decisions regarding subsequent
additional prosecutions.  If the Mineral County prosecutor adhered to the
recommendation, Treatment Court participants would necessarily insulate
themselves from coerced self-incrimination.  Instead, participants must re-
spond honestly to questions about positive urinalyses178 and, as a result,
may face additional charges.179  Plouffe tested positive for marijuana in
June 2011 (four months before he tested positive for benzodiazepines), and
the Treatment Court merely sanctioned him with community service.180
177. Berman & Feinblatt, supra n. 47, at 177–178.
178. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, supra n. 4, at ex. 1.
179. See id. at ex. 43.
180. Id. at ex. 8.
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Conversely, after Plouffe confessed to consuming one prescription pill and
selling another, the prosecutor charged Plouffe with multiple felony drug-
related offenses.181  Treatment Court participants experience understanda-
ble confusion regarding which drug-related behaviors will result in addi-
tional charges.
B. Defense Attorneys’ Failure to Protect Participants’
Fundamental Rights
When the Montana Legislature contemplated drug treatment courts,
legislators discussed how the presence of counsel would protect partici-
pants’ rights.182  Specifically, legislators contemplated a public defender
serving as a member of the drug treatment court team.183  According to the
Bureau of Justice Assistance, defense attorneys also have key responsibili-
ties to protect drug treatment court participants’ due process rights.  The
defense attorney:
• Advises the defendant as to the nature and purpose of the drug court, the
rules governing participation, the consequences of abiding or failing to
abide by the rules, and how participating or not participating in the drug
court will affect his or her interests.
• Explain all of the rights that the defendant will temporarily or permanently
relinquish.
• Gives advice on alternative courses of action, including legal and treatment
alternatives available outside the drug court program, and discusses with the
defendant the long-term benefits of sobriety and a drug-free life.
• Explains that because criminal prosecution for admitting to AOD [alcohol
or drug] use in open court will not be invoked, the defendant is encouraged
to be truthful with the judge and with treatment staff, and informs the par-
ticipant that he or she will be expected to speak directly to the judge, not
through an attorney.184
In Mineral County, some drug treatment court participants never meet
a defense attorney.  This necessarily means Treatment Court participants do
not receive the type of advice and explanation that the Bureau of Justice
Assistance contemplated.  When the Montana Legislature enacted the Drug
Offender Accountability and Treatment Act, it enumerated a defense attor-
ney only as a permissive member of a drug court treatment team.185  Al-
though a defense attorney must sign a Treatment Court participant’s Agree-
ment in Mineral County, this does not necessarily signify the attorney and
defendant have ever communicated with each other.
181. Id. at ex. 44.
182. Hearing on HB 721, supra n. 55.
183. Id.
184. Defining Drug Courts, supra n. 37, at 3–4.
185. Mont. Code Ann. § 46–1–1103(7).
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The Bureau of Justice Assistance recommends that defense attorneys
encourage their clients to confess to drug or alcohol use in open court.186
However, the Bureau of Justice Assistance also recommends that prosecu-
tors refrain from filing additional charges as the result of such confessions.
Regardless, no defense attorney advised Plouffe about what he should or
should not disclose either in open court or to drug treatment court person-
nel.  Neither the Treatment Court probation officer nor the deputy sheriff
contacted Plouffe’s attorney of record.  All treatment courts would signifi-
cantly reduce the risk of Sixth Amendment right to counsel violations by
ensuring a defense attorney serve as a member of the drug treatment court
team.
VI. SOLUTIONS FOR ENSURING FIFTH & SIXTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTIONS FOR DRUG TREATMENT COURT PARTICIPANTS
The repeated violations of future drug treatment court participants’
fundamental rights could be rectified, in part, by the Montana Legislature.
The Drug Offender Accountability and Treatment Act should require that a
defense attorney serve as an integral member of any drug treatment court
team.  By mandating the inclusion of a defense attorney, not only would
Montana treatment courts be compliant with the Bureau of Justice Assis-
tance’s recommendations, but drug treatment court participants would re-
ceive legal advice to make informed decisions and protect their fundamen-
tal rights.
Like drug treatment courts, court-ordered sex offender treatment pro-
grams have faced challenges to effect a fair balance between reducing re-
cidivism and protecting participants’ Fifth Amendment privileges against
self-incrimination.  Four solutions have emerged.
First, protecting both the public’s safety and drug treatment court par-
ticipants’ Fifth Amendment rights could result by applying the psycholo-
gist-client privilege.187  In Montana, a psychologist, social worker, or coun-
selor is often a member of a drug treatment court team.188  By applying the
psychologist-client privilege189 to protect drug treatment court participants’
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, the participant’s urinal-
ysis results would be administered by and discussed with a psychologist.
Consequently, the counselor would abide by Montana’s psychologist–client
privilege and refrain from disclosing particular results.  The psychologist
186. Defining Drug Courts, supra n. 37, at 4.
187. Merrill Maiano, Sex Offender Probationers and the Fifth Amendment: Rethinking Compulsion
and Exploring Preventative Measures in the Face of Required Treatment Programs, 10 Lewis & Clark
L. Rev. 989, 1017 (2006).
188. Mont. Code Ann. § 46–1–1103(7).
189. Mont. Code Ann. § 26–1–807.
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could report generally to the drug treatment court team regarding the par-
ticipant’s progress and struggles.  Moreover, rehabilitation rates may in-
crease because drug treatment court participants would feel more willing to
disclose and discuss their relapses and challenges.
Enacting laws that more clearly define the scope of drug treatment
court participants’ rights presents a second possible solution.  In addition to
a new provision mandating defense counsel, new statutory provisions could
dictate that drug treatment court participants retain protection against self-
incrimination, regardless of whether they affirmatively invoke that protec-
tion.  Finally, a new provision could mandate that a drug treatment court
participant cannot be questioned about positive urinalyses until his defense
attorney has been contacted.
The third solution would apply a unique, purpose-based test to decide
whether a statement falls under the definition of coercion.  Generally, courts
apply the “penalty test” when determining whether a self-incriminating
statement meets the standard of compulsion.  The U.S. Supreme Court has
defined a penalty situation as one in which the state not only compels an
individual to appear and testify but also seeks to induce him to forgo the
Fifth Amendment privilege by threatening to impose economic or other
sanctions capable of forcing the self-incrimination that the Fifth Amend-
ment forbids.190  The penalty test sets a high standard, which is arguably
not met regarding drug treatment court participants.  But a purpose-based
test has been defined by Justice O’Connor as determining the purpose for
which the government sought the compelled testimony.191  If the govern-
ment sought the compelled testimony wholly for rehabilitation, then the tes-
timony would be admissible for future prosecution.  If the government
sought the compelled testimony in part for investigation of a new crime, the
self-incriminating testimony would be suppressed.192
The fourth solution, limited immunity, provides the best assurance that
drug treatment court participants’ fundamental rights will be upheld.  Some
sex offender treatment programs offer immunity from additional prosecu-
tion.193  If this solution was applied to drug treatment courts, participants
could freely discuss relapses with treatment court members without the fear
of additional prosecution.  And nothing would prevent law enforcement
from conducting routine, independent investigations of reported crimes.
The immunity provision would simply prevent drug treatment court person-
nel from sharing incriminating information about participants with law en-
190. Lefkowitz, 431 U.S. at 805.
191. Maiano, supra n. 187, at 1012.
192. Id. at 1009.
193. Tanabe, supra n. 154, at 850–852.
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forcement.194  Additionally, the government attorney that sits on the treat-
ment court team could be a civil attorney, available to act only if a civil
commitment proceeding became necessary.195  By including the civil gov-
ernment attorney, the public’s safety would be protected.
When the Montana Senate Judiciary Committee discussed the bill that
would later become the Drug Offender and Accountability Act, the state
senators actually contemplated an immunity provision.196  The senators in-
quired of each other about any known lawsuits regarding violations of de-
fendants’ constitutional rights, and none were aware of any lawsuit.197
Consequently, the state senators concluded an immunity provision was un-
necessary.198
Nevertheless, even under a system affording immunity, if a drug treat-
ment court participant tests positive for alcohol or drugs and/or confesses to
drug or alcohol use, the drug treatment court can still expel the participant
from the program.  Upon expulsion, the participant’s original conditional
guilty plea converts to a guilty plea.  Similarly, if a drug treatment court
participant invokes his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, he only risks expulsion from drug treatment court.  No threat of addi-
tional charges should exist.  Again, nothing would prevent law enforcement
from conducting an independent investigation on reported crimes.
VII. CONCLUSION
The judiciary identified a societal need to assist drug abusers and con-
sequently created an alternative to the traditional adversarial system.  In
part, reducing recidivism drove the early treatment courts, but altruistic in-
tentions represented an additional motivator.  It is unlikely, therefore, that
using participants’ self-incriminating statements to file multiple felony
charges was within the judiciary’s contemplation.
Any treatment program for addictive behavior necessarily contem-
plates participants’ setbacks.199  When participants candidly share their re-
lapses within the rehabilitative confines of the drug treatment court, law
enforcement should not be privy to such disclosures.  If an independent
investigation of a reported crime warrants the filing of new charges against
a participant, then the self-incriminating statements will not be tainted.
Coercing the criminally accused to make self-incriminating statements
not only violates that person’s fundamental privilege against self-incrimina-
194. Graeber, supra n. 153, at 160.
195. See Maiano, supra n. 187, at 1020.
196. Hearing on HB 721, supra n. 55.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Problem-Solving Courts, supra n. 43, at 39.
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tion, it also defies the non-adversarial, cooperative model of drug treatment
courts.  Moreover, when a prosecutor uses a first-time, non-violent misde-
meanor drug offender’s confession to file multiple felony charges, a prece-
dent is set for an unsuccessful treatment court.
A limited immunity provision could fix what ails the Mineral County
DUI/Drug Treatment Court.  Had a limited immunity provision been in
place in 2011, it remains unclear whether Karlyle Plouffe would be serving
a three-year sentence as a convicted felon.  Perhaps the Mineral County
Sheriff’s Office would have independently acquired sufficient evidence for
the prosecutor to charge Plouffe with felony Criminal Possession of Dan-
gerous Drugs and felony Criminal Distribution of Dangerous Drugs.  In-
stead, Treatment Court team members shared damning evidence against
Plouffe with the Sheriff’s Office and the Mineral County Attorney.  Plouffe
confessed to illegally consuming narcotics, so he violated Montana law.
Nevertheless, U.S. Supreme Court Justice William Douglas’s words should
serve as a guiding force for reform in Mineral County: “What is at stake for
an accused facing . . . imprisonment demands the utmost solicitude of
which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make
sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its conse-
quence.”200
200. Boykin v. Ala., 395 U.S. 238, 243–244 (1969).
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